In this note we introduce and analyse maximal covering location games. As the core may be empty, several sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness are presented.
A note on Maximal Covering Location Games
Loe Schlicher, Marco Slikker, Geert-Jan van Houtum 
Introduction
In the maximal covering location problem (Church and ReVelle [1] ) a single decision maker has to position a predetermined number of resources in order to maximize profit of the covered demand points, where a demand point is covered if a resource is positioned within a certain radius. This well-known location model has proven to be useful in many settings, e.g., for positioning of emergency vehicles (Li et al. [4] ), cell towers (Lee and Murray [3] ) and retail stores (Plastria and Vanhaverbeke [5] ). Another interesting setting is the one with several small-sized regions, e.g., villages or municipalities, that each may or may not own a single resource to cover their region completely. When those regions pool their resources a maximal covering location problem arises. Typically, additional coverage, and so additional profit, can be realized and a joint profit allocation issue arises amongst the collaborating regions. In this note, we will investigate this allocation aspect. We introduce a maximal covering location number of players, the number of resources, and the underlying integer linear program) for core non-emptiness. For each condition we provide an example showing that when the condition is not satisfied, core non-emptiness is not guaranteed.
The outline of this note is as follows. We start in Section 2 with preliminaries on cooperative game theory. In Section 3, we introduce MCL situations, subsequently we introduce MCL games, and finally we present our results.
Preliminaries
In this section, we provide some basic elements of cooperative game theory. Consider ∑ i∈N x i = v(N). This implies that all worth is divided among the players of the grand coalition N. An allocation is stable if no group of players has an incentive to leave the grand coalition N, i.e., ∑ i∈S x i ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N. The set of efficient and stable allocations of (N, v) is the core of (N, v) and denoted by C(N, v).
Model
In this section, we introduce maximal covering location situations and define the associated games, called maximal covering location games. Finally, we present properties of maximal covering location games.
Maximal covering location situation
We consider an environment with a finite set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players and a finite set L = {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , n + l} of possible resource locations. The distance between player i ∈ N and resource location j ∈ L is denoted by d ij ∈ R + . For any player i ∈ N, we introduce r i ∈ {0, 1}, where r i = 1 indicates that player i ∈ N owns a resource, and with N, L, p = (p i ) i∈N , r = (r i ) i∈N , d = (d ij ) i∈N,j∈L and D as described above. For short, we will use θ to refer to such an MCL situation θ = (N, L, p, r, d, D ) and Θ for the set of MCL situations. In addition, for all θ ∈ Θ, we define
and construct a corresponding (bipartite)
with N and L the sets of nodes and E = {(i, j) i∈N,j∈L i } the set of edges. Note that an edge between player i ∈ N and resource location j ∈ L indicates that the distance between these nodes is no more than D, implying that player i is covered when a resource is positioned at this location j.
Maximal covering location game
As some players may not own a resource, additional profit can be realized when resources are pooled amongst the players. In line with Church and ReVelle [1] , we assume for any coalition S ⊆ N that coverage of any player i ∈ S by one (or possibly multiple) resource(s) results into a profit of p i . As a consequence, any S ⊆ N faces the joint problem of where to position the resources such that the sum of the individual profits (of coalition S) is maximized. For every MCL situation θ ∈ Θ and all S ⊆ N this corresponding MCL problem can be formulated as
The first constraint ensures that the profit of player i ∈ S is obtained only if at least one resource of coalition S is positioned within distance D. The second constraint ensures that the total number of resources used does not exceed the number of available resources of coalition S. The third and fourth constraint enforce integrality of the variables. Note that a solution of the MCL problem indicates at which resource locations a resource is positioned and which players obtain a profit. In particular, if a resource is positioned at resource location j ∈ L, then x j = 1 and otherwise x j = 0.
Similarly, if player i ∈ S obtains profit p i , then y i = 1, otherwise y i = 0.
In the remainder of this paper, we denote for every MCL situation θ ∈ Θ and all S ⊆ N the optimal value of MCL θ (S) by opt(MCL θ (S)). (2, 5) , (3, 5) } is represented in Figure 1 . We proceed with associating an MCL game to any MCL situation.
Definition 1.
For every MCL situation θ ∈ Θ, we call the game (N, v θ ) with
the associated MCL game.
Now, we present an example of an MCL game.
Example 2.
Consider the situation of Example 1. The associated MCL game is presented in Table 1 . A natural next step is to investigate whether the cores of MCL games are non-empty.
The following example illustrates that this is not the case in general. (2, 5) , (2, 6) , (3, 6) , (3, 7) , (4, 8) } is represented in Figure 2 . Now, observe that v θ (N) = 3, v θ (N\{i}) = 2 for i ∈ {1, 2}, and v θ (N\{i}) = 3 for i ∈ {3, 4}. Suppose the core is non-empty. Let x ∈ C(N, v θ ).
and x 4 ≤ 0. This conflicts with efficiency, i.e., ∑ i∈N x i ≤ 2 < 3 = v θ (N). Hence, we conclude that the core is empty.
The graph corresponding to the MCL situation of Example 3 contains a cycle. In some other cooperative games related to problems in combinatorial optimization non-emptiness of the core is guaranteed when cycles are not present in the corresponding graph (Deng et al. [2] ). For instance, for cost covering games this has been studied by Tamir [7] . One may wonder whether this holds for MCL games as well. The following 6-person MCL situation with a corresponding graph without cycles illustrates that this is not the case in general. (2, 8) , (3, 8) , (3, 9) , (4, 9), (5, 8) , (5, 10), (6, 10)} is represented in Figure 3 . In addition, v θ (N\{i}) = 4 for i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, and v θ (N\{i}) = 3 for i ∈ {1, 6}. Suppose the core is non-empty. Let x ∈ C(N, v θ ).
. This conflicts with efficiency, i.e.,
Hence, the core is empty. 
Proposition 2.
For every MCL situation θ ∈ Θ and associated MCL game (N, v θ ), the core is non-empty if k players with k ∈ {0, 1, n − 1, n} own a resource.
Proof : See Appendix.
Remark 1.
If the condition of Proposition 2 is not satisfied, core non-emptiness is not guaranteed. In Example 3 with four players and two resources the core is empty.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 2, we can conclude that the core of every kperson MCL game with k ∈ {1, 2, 3} is non-empty.
Theorem 1.
Every k-person MCL game with k ∈ {1, 2, 3} has a non-empty core.
We continue by addressing our second question of interest. For this, we introduce some definitions and present a proposition and two lemmas which are of interest by themselves as well. For every MCL situation θ ∈ Θ and all S ⊆ N we define RMCL θ (S)
as a relaxation of MCL θ (S) where x j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ L and 0 ≤ y i ≤ 1 for all i ∈ S. Note that x j ≤ 1 for all j ∈ L is not taken into consideration. Based on this relaxation, we formulate a sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core.
Remark 2.
If the sufficient condition of Proposition 3 is not satisfied, core non-emptiness is not guaranteed. For instance, in Example 4 it holds that
for all j ∈ L), and C(N, v θ ) = ∅. In addition, the condition of Proposition 3 is not necessary. For instance, in Example 4 with r 2 = r 3 = 1 and r i = 0 for all i ∈ N\{2, 3}, it holds that
A square submatrix of a matrix A ∈ R w×z (where w is the number of rows and z is the number of columns) is a matrix A ∈ R q×q formed by selecting q rows and q columns from the matrix A. Moreover, a matrix is totally unimodular if every square submatrix of A has determinant equal to +1, −1 or 0. Lemma 1. Let A be a totally unimodular w × z matrix and let b ∈ Z w and c ∈ R z . Then the linear programming problem max{cx|x ≥ 0, Ax ≤ b} has integer optimal solutions, whenever it has a finite optimum.
Proof : See e.g. Wolsey [8, p.40] .
where L −j = L\{j} and d −j = (d ij ) i∈N,j∈L\{j} . In addition, for every θ ∈ Θ, resource location j ∈ L is called obsolete if there exists k ∈ L\{j} for which N j ⊆ N k .
Lemma 2.
For any θ ∈ Θ with an obsolete resource location j ∈ L, it holds that
Note that the result of Lemma 2 follows directly, as (for every M ⊆ N) there exists a k ∈ L\{j} with N j ⊆ N k which makes k superfluous. Now, we are able to affirmatively answer our second question of interest. We provide a sketch of the proof here. The complete proof is relegated to the appendix. Hence, if the core is non-empty for the game corresponding to MCL situation without the obsolete resource location, it is the case for the other game as well. So, it suffices to consider the three cases, including that (i) |L| ≥ 3 and (ii) the corresponding graphs are free of obsolete resource locations and cycles. In Figure 4 , the possible graphs for |N| = 4 with |L| ≥ 3 are presented. (g)
(h)
(l)
(n) (r) 
For all these MCL situations, we can show that matrix A is totally unimodular 1 and vector b (of the standard LP-form) has all integer entries. In addition, it holds that p i ∈ R + for all i ∈ N and so, we can conclude that the relaxation of the MCL problem has an integer optimal solution (Lemma 1). Hence, the optimal value of the MCL problem coincides with the optimal value of the relaxation of the MCL problem and thus, the core is non-empty (Proposition 3). This leads to the our final theorem.
Theorem 2. Every k-person MCL game with k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and no cycles in the corresponding graph has a non-empty core.
Remark 3. The more general case in which each player may own several resources to cover multiple demand points can be deducted from our situation easily by merging several players (with and without a resource) into one (super)player. All sufficient conditions can be translated to this situation easily.
1 For all 28 possible graphs (of Figure 4 and Figure 5 together) one can check via standard software packages that every submatrix of A has determinant 1,0 or -1.
Proof of Proposition 1
First we show that every MCL game is superadditive. Let θ ∈ Θ be an MCL situation and (N, v θ ) be the associated MCL game. In addition, let S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅.
Moreover, let ((x S j ) j∈L , (y S i ) i∈S ) be an optimal solution of coalition S, and ((x T j ) j∈L , (y T i ) i∈T ) be an optimal solution of coalition T. Now, we construct a solution ((x j ) j∈L , (y i ) i∈S∪T ), given by
We claim that ((x j ) j∈L , (y i ) i∈S∪T ) is feasible. Let i ∈ S, then
where the equality holds by definition. The first inequality holds as x S j ≤ max{x S j , x T j } for all j ∈ L i , and the second inequality holds by the feasibility of ((x S j ) j∈L , (y S i ) i∈S ). In a similar way, this holds for any i ∈ T. Now, observe that
where the first and second equality hold by definition. The first inequality holds as max{x S j , x T j } ≤ x S j + x T j for all j ∈ L, and the second inequality holds by the feasibility of ((x S j ) j∈L , (y S i ) i∈S ) and ((x T j ) j∈L , (y T i ) i∈T ). Finally, observe that x j ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ L, and y i ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ S ∪ T. Hence, ((x j ) j∈L , (y i ) i∈S∪T ) is a feasible solution. From this, we conclude that
where the first equality holds as ((x j ) j∈L , (y i ) i∈S∪T ) is a feasible solution, with associated profit that is at most as much as the profit under an optimal solution of coalition S ∪ T. The first and second equality hold by definition. Now, we show that every MCL game is monotonic. Let θ ∈ Θ be an MCL situation and (N, v θ ) be the associated MCL game. In addition, let S, T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T. First, observe that v(T\S) ≥ 0 as ∑ i∈T\S p i · y i = 0 under feasible solution x j = 0 for all j ∈ L and y i = 0 for all i ∈ T\S. Then, observe that
where the first equality holds as v θ (T\S) ≥ 0. The second equality holds as MCL games are superadditive. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
We consider the 4 possibilities of k separately.
1.
Let θ 0 ∈ Θ be an MCL situation where no player owns a resource, i.e., k = 0, and (N, v θ 0 ) be the associated MCL game. As no player owns a resource, it holds that v θ 0 (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N. Hence, the game is additive and from this we conclude that the core is non-empty.
2.
Let θ 1 ∈ Θ be an MCL situation where exactly one player owns a resource, i.e., k = 1, and (N, v θ 1 ) be the associated MCL game. Assume that player i * ∈ N owns a resource. Now, let x i * = v θ 1 (N) and x i = 0 for all i ∈ N\{i * }. Then, for any S ⊆ N with i * ∈ S, it holds that ∑ i∈S x i = 0 = v θ 1 (S). For any S ⊆ N with i * ∈ S, it holds
The last inequality holds as MCL games are monotonic. Finally, observe that ∑ i∈N x i = v θ 1 (N) and thus x ∈ C(N, v θ 1 ).
3.
Let θ n−1 ∈ Θ be an MCL situation where everyone owns a resource, except for one player, i.e., k = n − 1, and (N, v θ n−1 ) be the associated MCL game. Let i * ∈ N be the player with r i * = 0. If |N| ≤ 2, we end up in case 1 or 2. Hence, we can restrict attention to |N| > 2. We distinguish between two cases (and two subcases per case).
Case a. For all i ∈ N it holds that L i = ∅.
Observe that for every i ∈ N there exists a j ∈ L i such that j ∈ L i for all i ∈ N\{i}.
As n − 1 resources are available only, it follows that
where p min(S) = min i∈S p i for all S ⊆ N. Let x i * = p i * − p min(N) and x i = p i for all i ∈ N\{i * }. Note that p min(N) ≤ p min(S) for all S ⊆ N. Now, for any S ⊆ N with i * ∈ S, it holds that ∑ i∈S x i = ∑ i∈S p i = v θ n−1 (S), where the last equality holds as every i ∈ S owns a resource. In addition, for any S ⊆ N with i * ∈ S, it holds
Observe that |L i | ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N and that there exists a j ∈ L and k, l ∈ N for which
Observe that for any S ⊆ N, it holds that ∑ i∈S x i = ∑ i∈S p i ≥ v θ n−1 (S) and ∑ i∈N x i = ∑ i∈N p i = v θ n−1 (N).
We conclude that x ∈ C(N, v θ ).
As player i * (also) has no resource, it can add nothing to any coalition. Hence, we can restrict ourselves to a subgame without player i * , i.e., with player set N\{i * } where each player owns a resource. Then, we end up in case 4.
Let T = {t ∈ N|L t = ∅}. As L i * = ∅, it holds that 1 ≤ |T| ≤ n − 1. Then, in the grand coalition, for any b ∈ B = N\T there is a resource available and so v θ n−1 (N) = ∑ i∈B p i .
As for all players t ∈ T it holds that they can never add any profit, it holds for any
4. Let θ n ∈ Θ be an MCL situation where every player owns a resource, i.e., k = n, and (N, v θ n ) be the associated MCL game. Let H = {h ∈ N|L h = ∅}. As a consequence, v θ n (S) = ∑ i∈S∩H p i for all S ⊆ N. Now, let x i = p i for each i ∈ H and x i = 0 for every i ∈ N\H. Then, observe that ∑ i∈S x i = ∑ i∈S∩H p i = v θ n (S) for each S ⊆ N. We conclude that the core is non-empty.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let θ ∈ Θ and assume that opt(MCL θ (N)) = opt(RMCL θ (N)). Let S ⊆ N. Note that RMCL θ (S) is feasible (as x j = 0 for all j ∈ L and y i = 0 for all i ∈ S is a feasible solution) and bounded (by ∑ i∈S p i + 1). Then, for the dual of RMCL θ (S), which is given by
where N S j = {i ∈ S|d ij ≤ D }, it holds based on the duality theorem of linear programming (see e.g. Schrijver [6, p.90 
Based on our assumption, it holds for S = N that
Again, let S ⊆ N. We claim that the restriction of any feasible solution
be an optimal solution of dual problem DRMCL θ (N). Note that this solution exists by the duality theorem of linear programming (again).
We construct a payoff vector z = (z i ) i∈N as follows
Now, observe that
where the third equality holds by equation (2) . In addition, let S ⊆ N and
where the first inequality holds as the value of feasible solution ((a * i ) i∈S , b * , (c * i ) i∈S ) is more than or equal to the optimal value of DRMCL θ (S). The first equality holds by equation (1) . The second inequality holds as we restrict to integer solutions only. As there exists a z = (z i ) i∈N for which ∑ i∈N z i = v θ (N) and ∑ i∈S z i ≥ v θ (S) for all S ⊆ N, we conclude that the core of (N, v θ ) is non-empty.
In order to prove Theorem 2 we introduce some new terminology. Graph G = (N, L, E) is isomorphic to graph G = ( N, L, E) if there is a one-to-one correspondence between the nodes in N and N and a one-to-one correspondence between the nodes in L and L such that a node in N and a node in L are connected directly if and only if the corresponding nodes in N and L are connected directly. In addition, we present two useful lemmas. has no cycles nor obsolete resource locations, then graph G = (N, L, E) is isomorphic to one of the graphs represented in Figure 4 .
Proof of Lemma 3
If there exists a j ∈ L for which N j = ∅ then this resource location is obsolete. So, from now on, suppose 1 ≤ |N j | ≤ 4 for all j ∈ L. We distinguish between cases |L| = 3, |L| = 4 and |L| ≥ 5. In each case, we force a contradiction (by showing that the graph has an obsolete resource location or a cycle) or present the possible graph(s).
Let L = {5, 6, 7} with |N 5 | ≥ |N 6 | ≥ |N 7 | without loss of generality. Now, we condition on the cardinality of N 5 , N 6 and N 7 .
Note that 6 ∈ L is obsolete if |N 6 | = 1. If |N 6 | ≥ 2, a cycle is formed.
We have |N 5 ∩ N 6 | ≥ 2. A cycle is formed.
In order to avoid cycles, we have |N 5 ∩ N 6 | = 1. Let N 5 = {1, 2, 3} and N 6 = {2, 4} without loss of generality. If |N 7 | = 1 then 7 ∈ L is obsolete. If |N 7 | = 2 a cycle is formed.
In order to avoid an obsolete resource location, we have N 5 ∩ N 6 = ∅. Let N 5 = {1, 2, 3} and N 6 = {4} without loss of generality. If |N 7 | = 1 then 7 ∈ L is obsolete. (i) If N 7 ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} a cycle is formed. For N 7 ∈ {{1, 4}, {3, 4}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to graph (a) (of Figure 4) . For N 7 = {2, 4} we obtain a graph isomorphic to graph (b) . If N 7 ∈ {{1}, {2}, {3}} we obtain an obsolete resource location. For N 7 = {4} we obtain a graph isomorphic to graph (c).
(ii) If N 7 ∈ {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} a cycle is formed. For N 7 ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to graph (a). If |N 7 | = 1, then resource location 7 ∈ L is obsolete.
In order to avoid obsolete resource locations, we have
, and N 7 = {4} without loss of generality. Then, we obtain a graph isomorphic to graph (d).
∅. Let N 5 = {1}, N 6 = {2}, and N 7 = {3} without loss of generality. Then, we obtain a graph isomorphic to graph (e). Note that 7 ∈ L is obsolete if |N 7 | = 1. If |N 7 | ≥ 2, a cycle is formed.
We have |N 6 ∩ N 7 | ≥ 2. Hence, a cycle is formed. 
In order to avoid an obsolete resource location, we have |N 6 ∩ N 7 | ≤ 1. Let (i) N 6 = {1, 2, 3} and N 7 = {3, 4} or (ii) N 6 = {1, 2, 3} and N 7 = {4, 5} without loss of generality.
For N 8 ∈ {{1, 5}, {2, 5}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (a) ( of Figure 5 ). For
we obtain a graph isomorphic to (b). For N 8 = {4, 5} we obtain a graph isomorphic to graph (c).
(ii) If N 8 ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}} a cycle is formed. For N 8 ∈ {{1, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to graph (c).
(m).
For N 9 ∈ {{1, 5}, {2, 5}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (n). If N 9 ∈ {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}}, resource location 9 ∈ L is obsolete. For N 9 = {5} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (o).
{3, 4}} a cycle is formed. For N 9 ∈ {{1, 5}, {3, 5}, {4, 5}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (n). For N 9 = {2, 5} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (p). If N 9 ∈ {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}}, resource location 9 ∈ L is obsolete. For N 9 = {5} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (q).
(h) N 6 = {1, 2}, N 7 = {2, 3}, N 8 = {4, 5}. If N 9 ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}} a cycle is formed. If N 9 ∈ {{1, 4}, {1, 5}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (m).
If N 9 ∈ {{2, 4}, {2, 5}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (r). If |N 9 | = 1, then resource location 9 ∈ L is obsolete.
By using the (same) reasoning of Case 1.j we end up with subgraph (i) and (j).
, then 9 ∈ L is an obsolete resource location. For N 9 = {5} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (s).
By using the (same) reasoning of Case 1.k we end up with subgraph (k).
(k) N 6 = {1, 2}, N 7 = {3}, N 8 = {4}. If N 9 ∈ {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}}, then resource location 9 ∈ L is obsolete. For N 9 = {5} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (t).
By using the (same) reasoning of Case 1.l we end up with subgraph (l).
(l) N 6 = {1}, N 7 = {2}, N 8 = {3}. If N 9 ∈ {{1}, {2}, {3}}, then resource location 9 ∈ L is obsolete. For N 9 ∈ {{4}, {5}} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (u). By using the (same) reasoning of Case 2.g we end up with subgraph (s). By using the (same) reasoning of Case 2.h we end up with subgraph (t).
(t) N 6 = {1, 2}, N 7 = {3}, N 8 = {4}, N 9 = {5}. If |N 10 | = 1, resource location 10 ∈ L is obsolete.
Case 3.e. |N 6 | = 1, |N 7 | = 1, |N 8 | = 1.
By using the (same) reasoning of Case 2.i we end up with subgraph (u).
(u) N 6 = {1}, N 7 = {2}, N 8 = {3}, N 9 = {4}. If N 10 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, resource location 10 ∈ L is obsolete. For N 10 = {5} we obtain a graph isomorphic to (v). By using the (same) reasoning of Case 3.e we end up with subgraph (v).
(v) N 6 = {1}, N 7 = {2}, N 8 = {3}, N 9 = {4}, N 10 = {5}. Let |N 11 | = 1. Then 11 ∈ L is obsolete.
We conclude that the graph (without cycles and obsolete resource locations) is isomorphic to one of the graphs of Figure 5 .
Proof of Theorem 2
We distinguish in the number of players. For k ∈ {1, 2, 3} the core is non-empty by Theorem 1. Hence, we can restrict attention to k = 4 and k = 5. The inequality is a natural upperbound. The first and third equality hold by definition.
The second equality holds as x i = 0 for all i ∈ N for which L i = ∅.
Case a.2. |L| ≥ 3.
For θ, i.e., the MCL situation under consideration, which has a corresponding graph has a finite optimum and so, by Lemma 1, RMCL θ (N) has integer optimal solutions.
As 0 ≤ y i ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N, it follows directly that 0 ≤ x j ≤ 1 for all j ∈ L for all optimal solutions of RMCL θ (N). Hence, RMCL θ (N) has an integer optimal solution
